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We therefore conclude that the universe is not a fluctuation, and that the
order is a memory of conditions when things started. This is not to say
that we understand the logic of it.
Richard Feynman (1963)
Abstract
One of the most difficult problems in the foundations of physics is what gives
rise to the arrow of time. Since the fundamental dynamical laws of physics are
(essentially) symmetric in time, the explanation for time’s arrow must come from
elsewhere. A promising explanation introduces a special cosmological initial
condition, now called the Past Hypothesis: the universe started in a low-entropy
state. Unfortunately, in a universe where there are many copies of us (in the distant
“past” or the distant “future”), the Past Hypothesis is not enough; we also need to
postulate self-locating (de se) probabilities. However, I show that we can similarly
use self-locating probabilities to strengthen its rival—the Fluctuation Hypothesis,
leading to in-principle empirical underdetermination and radical epistemological
skepticism. The underdetermination is robust in the sense that it is not resolved by
the usual appeal to ‘empirical coherence’ or ‘simplicity.’ That is a serious problem
for the vision of providing a completely scientific explanation of time’s arrow.
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1 Introduction
One of the most difficult problems in the foundations of physics is what gives rise to the
arrow of time.1 On the one hand, nature seems to display a striking pattern of temporal
asymmetry. An ice cube in a cup of hot coffee will melt; gas molecules contracted to a
corner of the room will spread out; and a banana on the kitchen table will turn black.
These processes (and many others) have a preferred temporal direction: they only
happen from the past to the future. We do not see them happen in the other direction:
an ice cube does not spontaneously form in a cup of hot coffee; gas molecules do not
spontaneously contract to a corner; and a banana does not become fresher after a week.
Physical states of the unmelted ice cube, the contracted gas molecules, and the
fresh banana are less “disorderly” than those of the melted ice cube, the dispersed
gas molecules, and the decayed banana. The former states have less thermodynamic
entropy than the latter states. The entropic arrow of time is defined as the direction of
entropy increase in time. Such an entropy increase is summarized in the Second Law of
Thermodynamics:
The Second Law The (thermodynamic) entropy of a closed system (typically) does not
decrease over time.
On the other hand, most candidates of fundamental dynamical laws of physics are
symmetric in time. Take F = ma for example together with Newtonian gravitation. For
any sequence of particle configurations that obeys F = ma, the time-reversal of that
sequence also obeys F = ma: one simply needs to reverse the direction of the final
particle velocities to get back to the initial state (with the opposite velocities). Similarly,
the Schödinger equation of quantum mechanics and the Einstein field equation of
general relativity are also symmetric in time (although their time-reversal operations
are somewhat different). The fundamental dynamical laws of physics allow an ice cube
to melt and also to spontaneously form in a cup of coffee. They are not sensitive to the
1In this paper, I use the phrase “the arrow of time” to designate the asymmetry of time. In particular,
I mean the “entropic” asymmetry of time for which the entropy is lower in the past and higher in the
future. Such asymmetries are not intended to replace the more mysterious notions such as the “flow of
time” or the “passage of time.” However, the latter notions may nonetheless be related to the former
notions. Understanding their connection is work outside the scope of this paper.
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past/future distinction, and they do not have a temporal directionality. Thus, they do
not explain the arrow of time.
Therefore, the arrow of time cannot come from the fundamental dynamical laws
alone. Indeed, the standard explanation of time’s arrow makes use of a special initial
condition. It is a plausible idea: if we start a physical system in a very low-entropy state
(unmelted ice, contracted gas, and fresh bananas), then the dynamical laws will (almost
surely) take it to a higher-entropy state.2 However, it is rather complicated to postulate
a low-entropy initial condition for every physical system. Instead, we can postulate
a low-entropy initial condition for the whole universe, which (we might accept on
the basis of some plausibility arguments and some rigorous mathematical proofs) will
likely lead to an increase of entropy for the whole universe as well as an increase of
entropy for typical subsystems in the universe. This low-entropy initial condition for
the universe is now called the Past Hypothesis (Albert 2000).
The explanation of time’s arrow in terms of the Past Hypothesis is suggested by
Boltzmann (1964)[1898]§89 (though he ultimately seems to favor what may be called the
Fluctuation Hypothesis) and has many advocates: Feynman et al. (2011)[1963], Feynman
(2017)[1965], Lebowitz (2008), Penrose (1979), Albert (2000), Callender (2004), North
(2011), Wallace (2011), Loewer (2016, 2020), Goldstein et al. (2020), and myself (Chen
2020, 2022).3 We all agree that some version of the Past Hypothesis should be postulated
in the fundamental physical theory. Setting aside future progress in cosmology,4 the
Past-Hypothesis explanation is a promising one for understanding time’s arrow in our
universe. Moreover, it has been argued that the explanation can also justify our standard
inferences to the past. Thus, the explanatory success may extend to the epistemic realm,
in which our ordinary beliefs about the past obtain their justification partly in virtue of
the Past Hypothesis.5 Based on these reasons, Albert (2000) and Loewer (2016, 2020)
further suggest that the Past Hypothesis (and an accompanying statistical postulate)
should be understood as a candidate fundamental law of nature.
The Past-Hypothesis explanation would be immensely powerful if it were successful.
One of its attractions is the realization of a bold and “fundamentalist” vision that time’s
arrow is to be scientifically explained in terms of objective laws of fundamental physics
(or objective postulates of fundamental physics), and such laws (or postulates) can be
empirically confirmed by our current evidence (Albert 2000, pp. ix, 65, 96, and 119, and
Loewer 2020). The explanation may be more satisfactory than a purely metaphysical
2We will explain the qualifier “almost surely” when we discuss the Statistical Postulate in §2.1.
3See Earman (2006) for some worries about the Past Hypothesis as a hypothesis about the initial
condition for the universe. See Goldstein et al. (2016) for a discussion about the possibility and some
recent examples, of explaining the arrow of time without the Past Hypothesis.
4See, for example, the interesting ideas of Carroll and Chen (2004). At the moment their proposal
is quite speculative, but it is conceptually illuminating as a possible alternative to the Past-Hypothesis
paradigm shared by the previously quoted people. See Goldstein et al. (2016) for some discussions of the
ideas of Carroll and Chen and those of Julian Barbour.
5Feynman has a beautiful way of describing this, in the text right after the epigraph (Feynman et al.
2011, 46-5): “For some reason, the universe at one time had a very low entropy for its energy content,
and since then the entropy has increased. So that is the way toward the future. That is the origin of all
irreversibility, that is what makes the processes of growth and decay, that makes us remember the past
and not the future, remember the things which are closer to that moment in the history of the universe
when the order was higher than now, and why we are not able to remember things where the disorder is
higher than now, which we call the future.”
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explanation that postulates a fundamental arrow of time in the world and justifies it on
a priori reasons. As such, its success would be philosophically significant.
Some, such as Winsberg (2004) and Earman (2006), have raised technical objections
against the explanation. In contrast, I focus on two conceptual worries about self-locating
(de se) probabilities that are troublesome even for those of us who defend the Past
Hypothesis research program and remain optimistic that the technical objections can
ultimately be overcome. Resolving the conceptual worries requires deeper engagement
between epistemologists and philosophers of physics. First, the Past Hypothesis (and
the accompanying statistical postulate) is not enough. We need to postulate certain
self-locating (de se) probabilities, in the form of a self-locating probability distribution
that has a temporal bias. That already is problematic for the original vision, since
it is doubtful that self-locating probabilities can be part of the objective physical
laws. Second and more surprisingly, if we allow self-locating probabilities to appear
in the physical theory, we open the Pandora’s box: they result in robust empirical
underdetermination and epistemological skepticism. That further undermines the
original vision of providing a completely scientific explanation.
First (in §2), I explain the motivations for the Self-Location Thesis: the Past Hypoth-
esis explanation of time’s arrow requires a postulate about self-locating probabilities.6
(Here and elsewhere in the paper, “self-locating” and “de se” are used interchangeably.)
In a universe that persists long enough, there may be many copies of us (e.g. produced
by random fluctuations). For reasons similar to the Boltzmann Brain argument (if we
are equally likely to be any observers with our mental states, then it is most likely we
are observers produced by the smallest fluctuations—the Boltzmann brains), we need to
postulate that our current time is located between the Big Bang and the first equilibrium
(with uniform probabilities over any observers that share our features). This part may
be familiar to experts in statistical mechanics, but I intentionally explain it slowly for
two reasons: (1) some readers with philosophical expertise may not be familiar with
the technical issues, and (2) we need to be as clear as we can to fully understand the
philosophical issues we face. The next worry builds on the first one.
Second (in §3), I argue that, if it is permissible to save the Past-Hypothesis explanation
by adding self-locating probabilities, we can do the same to strengthen its rival–the
Fluctuation Hypothesis–and achieve in-principle empirical underdetermination by our
current evidence. In retrospect this move may seem obvious, but as far as I know it
is new. A surprising consequence is that their empirical underdetermination leads to
radical skepticism. The strengthened version of the Fluctuation Hypothesis resembles
6Similar ideas are considered by Winsberg (2010, 2012), but his focus and arguments are different from
mine in the following ways. In his 2010, he suggests that the Past Hypothesis explanation of time’s arrow
requires a self-locating proposition that we are located between the time of the Past Hypothesis and the
first thermodynamic equilibrium. He argues that the necessity of postulating this self-locating proposition
is a problem for Loewer’s thesis that the lawfulness of special sciences (such as biology, psychology, and
economics) is grounded in the fundamental laws. Winsberg ultimately argues in favor of the autonomy
of the special sciences. I do not focus on the special sciences in this paper. Moreover, he does not draw
the connection to self-locating probabilities as I do here. In his 2012, he uses the self-locating proposition
in his cost-benefit analysis of a different explanation of time’s arrow—Carroll-Chen’s time-symmetric
model (2004) in which a “mother universe” that has no entropy maximum constantly gives birth to “baby
universes” starting in sufficiently low entropy. I do not discuss the Carroll-Chen model except to set it
aside.
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the infamous Boltzmann Brain Hypothesis. However, I explain that the augmented
version is more believable and epistemically robust given what I call “Boltzmann
bubbles.” It can even accommodate various epistemological positions that are ruled
out by the Boltzmann Brain Hypothesis. That has not been systematically argued for in
the literature.
The arguments can be seen as a dilemma. Either self-locating probabilities have
a place in a scientific explanation or they do not. On my view, both horns can be
problematic for the original vision. If they do not have a place in a scientific explanation,
the Past Hypothesis explanation is insufficient. If they do have a place, there is in-
principle empirical underdetermination such that two equally simple (or complex)
scientific theories say contradictory things about time’s arrow. Thus, postulating self-
locating probabilities to explain time’s arrow turns out to be doubly problematic. My
conclusions are conditional on the assumptions, and the particular skeptical conclusion
might be avoided by appealing to certain traditional epistemological responses. What
response to choose requires careful analysis of the case. Addressing these worries in a
thorough way may require expertise in epistemology and general philosophy of science.
Thus, the topic deserves a wider audience. Where possible, in this paper I try to explain
the concepts “from the ground up.” I hope the present analysis will lead to further
work on this issue and be of interest to epistemologists and general philosophers of
science.
In this paper, I assume that the universe allows many thermodynamic fluctuations.
It is an open question whether there are such fluctuations in our universe, depending
on whether the universal state space is finite or infinite (in terms of phase space volume
or Hilbert space dimension). Even if this were not true of the actual universe, it would
still be worth investigating how serious the problem would be, and what strategies we
would need, if Nature were not so kind to us. If the dilemma is worrisome enough,
that would provide additional motivation to look for a theory where fluctuations are
not as prevalent.
2 The Self-Location Thesis
In this section, we will first review the standard explanation for time’s arrow in terms of
the Past Hypothesis. We will introduce some concepts from philosophy of physics that
may be unfamiliar to non-specialists. We will then consider whether it is the best theory
that explains the evidence. To do so we will consider an alternative explanation without
the Past Hypothesis. Thinking about their differences leads us to the Self-Location
Thesis.
2.1 The Mentaculus Theory
According to the standard picture, the Past Hypothesis is key to understand the apparent
temporal asymmetry: from ice melting and gas dispersing to the more general statement
about entropy increase in the Second Law of Thermodynamics. However, it is to be
supplemented by two more postulates: the dynamical laws of physics (such as F = ma)
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Figure 1: The phase space (restricted to the energy shell). Each point corresponds to an
exact microstate. Each bounded region corresponds to a macrostate, which is a set of
macroscopically indistinguishable microstates. The equilibrium macrostate (maximum
entropy) takes up overwhelmingly most volume; all other macrostates are much smaller.
The macrostates partition the phase space into regions. From Penrose (1989).
and a probabilistic postulate called the Statistical Postulate. Together, they provide the
standard (probabilistic) explanation of time’s arrow, i.e., the (typical) unidirectional
change of entropy.
To appreciate the explanation that the Past Hypothesis provides, let us introduce
some technical terms from statistical mechanics. The Past Hypothesis ensures that the
universe started in a low-entropy initial condition.7 But how should we understand
this notion of entropy? Entropy is a macroscopic quantity that is on par with density
and pressure. It can be calculated by measuring the transformations in thermodynamic
quantities.8 However, it can also be defined using a distinction between the macrostates
and the microstates. To illustrate, let us consider a classical-mechanical system of
gas in a box.9 A macrostate is a characterization of the gas in a box in terms of
macroscopic variables such as pressure, volume, and temperature, while a microstate is
a characterization of the system in terms of microscopic variables such as the positions
and velocities of all of the gas molecules. A macrostate is compatible with many possible
microstates—a macrostate is multiply-realizable by many different microstates. The
actual microstate realizes a particular macrostate, but it shares the macrostate with
many other microstates (that are macroscopically similar).
Intuitively, there are more microstates realizing the macrostate in which all the gas
molecules are spread out uniformly than there are microstates realizing the macrostate
7In this paper we assume that the universe in fact has a temporal boundary or a space-time singularity
that can be called “the beginning.” To relax this assumption, as some cosmological theories does, will
take us to more complex issues than we have the space to discuss here. The lesson we learn under such
an assumption might carry over (with some modifications) to the more general discussion that does not
assume that.
8For example, Clausius (1867) defines the change in entropy for an isolated system to be equal to the
change in heat divided by temperature.
9Below we will use some concepts from classical statistical mechanics. For the technically inclined,
we note that the classical framework can be adapted to a quantum framework as follows: use a Hilbert
space instead of phase space, a state vector instead of a phase point, a subspace instead of a subset, and
dimension counting instead of volume measure to measure entropy. See Goldstein and Tumulka (2011)
for an informative overview of Boltzmannian quantum statistical mechanics.
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in which all of them are contracted to a corner. According to Ludwig Boltzmann,
(thermodynamic) entropy measures how “many” microstates are compatible with a
given macrostate.10 It follows, on this definition of entropy, the “spread-out” state has
higher entropy than the “contracted” state. The uniformly spread-out state of gas in
a box also corresponds to thermal equilibrium, the state of entropy maximum. We
can plot all the microstates on a 6N−dimensional space called the phase space. The
macrostates are sets of microstates that are macroscopically indistinguishable; they
partition the space into distinct non-overlapping regions. The standard way of counting
the microstates, since there is an infinity of them, is by using the standard Lebesgue
measure on phase space. On this way of counting, the equilibrium state takes up the
overwhelming majority of volume in phase space (see Figure 1).
In the language of phase space, we can consider (as a first approximation) the entire
universe to be such a classical system. Then the Past Hypothesis selects a special
macrostate M(0) to be where the initial microstate of the universe lies in. M(0) is small
in volume measure. Thus, it has very low entropy (by Boltzmann’s definition). But it is
still compatible with a continuous infinity of microstates. For a typical initial microstate
lying in M(0), it will follow the dynamical laws (such as F = ma) to evolve into other
microstates. Since the overwhelming majority of microstates surrounding M(0)will
lie in macrostates of larger volume, typical trajectories from M(0)will get into larger
macrostates than M(0), which correspond to higher entropy.11
However, as Albert (2000) explains, the Past Hypothesis is still not sufficient. Not all
microstates lying in M(0)will get into higher-entropy macrostates. Some of them are
“bad”: they will evolve under the dynamical laws into lower-entropy macrostates.12 We
need a reason to neglect these microstates. The Statistical Postulate provides such a
reason. It specifies a uniform probability distribution (with respect to Lebesgue measure)
on phase space. According to this probability distribution, these “bad” microstates
are overwhelmingly unlikely. That is, it is overwhelmingly likely that our world did
not start in one of those “bad” microstates. Hence, it is with overwhelming likelihood
that the entropy of our world has always been increasing in the past and will continue
increasing in the future. (See Figure 2.) This constitutes a probabilistic explanation of
the entropic arrow of time.
10For the technically inclined, here are some formal details. The Boltzmann entropy of a microstate is
proportional to the volume of the macrostate that it belongs to:
SB(X) = kBlog∣ΓM(X)∣,
where X is the microstate of the system, kB is the Boltzmann constant, ΓM(X) is region of phase space
that corresponds to the macrostate of X, and ∣ ⋅ ∣ denotes the volume measure of the 6N-dimensional
phase space. It follows that the larger the macrostate, the higher the Boltzmann entropy. By Liouville’s
Theorem, the Lebesgue measure is invariant under the classical equations of motion. If at t1 the system
is in X1 which belongs to a small macrostate M1, and at t2 the system is in X2 which belongs to a large
macrostate M2, then the Boltzmann entropy has increased from t1 to t2. The transition from X1 to X2
from t1 to t2 is determined by the classical laws of motion, i.e. Hamilton’s equations.
11This is a place where rigorous results are difficult to obtain. The history of statistical mechanics
contains many attempts to make progress in this direction. Boltzmann’s not fully rigorous argument for
his Boltzmann equation is one step in the direction. Oscar E. Lanford’s celebrated proof of statistical
results in a model of hard spheres and diluted gas are further steps of significance. See Uffink and Valente
(2010) for more discussions and references.







Figure 2: The Past Hypothesis selects a low-entropy initial condition, a special macrostate
M(0). The macrostate E stands for the macrostate of the universe at the time of
observation.
Following Albert (2000) and Loewer (2016), let us call the following the Mentaculus
Theory (TM)13:
1. Fundamental Dynamical Laws (FDL): A specification of the evolution of the
fundamental microstates of the universe (and the fundamental microstates of its
isolated sub-systems).
2. The Past Hypothesis (PH): A specification of a boundary condition characterizing
the universe’s macrostate at the time of the Big Bang as M(0). In agreement with
contemporary cosmology, M(0) is a macrostate with extremely low entropy.
3. The Statistical Postulate (SP): A uniform probability distribution (specified by
the standard Lebesgue measure) over the physically possible microstates that
realize M(0).
Together, these three postulates provide an explanation for the arrow of time exemplified
by the unidirectional change of entropy. PH and SP constitute an extremely biased
initial probability distribution on phase space. They make it overwhelmingly likely that
the microstate of our universe lies on a trajectory that will go to higher-entropy states.
13The term “Mentaculus Theory” comes from the phrase “Mentaculus Vision” which is coined by
Loewer (2016). It is based on the movie A Serious Man (2009) directed by Ethan Coen and Joel Coen.
In the movie, the title of Arthur’s book is The Mentaculus, which means the “probability map of the
universe.” Here, the Mentaculus Vision is supposed to provide, given the probability distribution of PH
+ SP, a probability assignment of every proposition that can be formulated in the languages of phase
space or of the Hilbert space. Barry Loewer calls the joint system—the package of laws that includes PH
and SP in addition to the dynamical laws of physics—the Mentaculus Vision.
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2.2 The Fluctuation Theory
The Mentaculus Theory (TM) explains the origin of temporal asymmetry in terms of a
specially chosen initial condition and a probability distribution—the Past Hypothesis
(PH) and the Statistical Postulate (SP). It has an ambitious aim of explaining a wide
range of phenomena: ice melts in room temperature; things grow and decay; and many
other temporally asymmetric phenomena (and perhaps even the asymmetry of records
and control: that we have records of the past but not of the future, and we currently
have control of the future but not of the past14). This theory could be our best guide to
time’s arrow.
What are our grounds for endorsing TM? Defenders of this theory (such as Albert
and Loewer) suggest that it is our best explanation for time’s arrow. But can we rule out
all other possible explanations? Is PH really better than its alternatives? The answers
are not so simple.
Let us consider an alternative to TM—the Fluctuation Hypothesis. This alternative is
related to suggestive remarks made by Ludwig Boltzmann (1964 (1899), §90). Boltzmann
might have endorsed it at some point. The motivation is as follows. It seems that the
special initial condition in TM is too special and too contrived. Penrose (1989) estimates
that the initial macrostate M(0) is tiny compared to the available volume on phase
space. A rough calculation based on classical general relativity suggests that the Past
Hypothesis macrostate (specified using the Weyl curvature) is only 1
1010123
of the total
volume in phase space. It seems more satisfactory to explain why the universe started
in such a special state than to postulate it as axiomatic as on TM.
One way to explain PH is based on thermodynamic fluctuations. The universe,
considered as a closed thermodynamic system, will typically increase in entropy and
remain the same after it reaches the entropy maximum. However, sometimes it will
decrease in entropy, producing a thermodynamic fluctuation—a deviation from the
normal behavior. Thermodynamic fluctuations are rare, but they do occur given enough
time. This is the reason that the Second Law of Thermodynamics should be regarded
as a probabilistic (or statistical) law that holds with overwhelming probability but not
with certainty.
An extreme kind of fluctuation is demonstrated by Poincaré to occur in some systems.
The Poincaré Recurrence Theorem says, roughly, that if we start from anywhere in
phase space, we will (almost surely) come back to it infinitely many times.15 The
argument, however, assumes that the phase space of the system is bounded with finite
volume. This assumption may or may not apply to our universe. It is still an open
question whether there can be such dramatic kinds of fluctuations, i.e. recurrences, in
our universe. The question depends on whether the universal state space (phase space
14See Albert (2000) and Loewer (2020) for arguments that connect the Mentaculus Theory to these
other arrows of time.
15For the mathematically inclined, here is a rigorous statement of the theorem. Let (X,B, µ) be a
measure space. Let T ∶ (X,B) → (X,B) be a function such that ∀A ∈ B,T−1(A) ∈ B. Definition: the
measure µ is a T-invariant measure if ∀A ∈ B, µ(A) = µ(T−1(A)).
Theorem 2.1 (The Poincaré Recurrence Theorem) Let µ be a T-invariant measure with µ(X) <∞. ∀A ∈ B







Figure 3: The Fluctuation Hypothesis allows the universe to start in any macrostate.
But the theory predicts that the universe will eventually fluctuate to a low-entropy
macrostate M(0), which produces the history of the observable universe, including the
macrostate E at the time of observation.
or Hilbert space) is infinite. However, even if we cannot guarantee the existence of
recurrences by something like Poincaré Recurrence Theorem, we cannot rule out the
existence of less dramatic fluctuations and more localized fluctuations. Recurrences
are sufficient but not necessary for the Fluctuation Hypothesis, which only attempts to
explain our observation by some random fluctuation (that can be much smaller than
a full recurrence). In any case, this is not the place to settle the technical question.16
The goal of the paper is rather conceptual. As mentioned earlier, even if we were to
have empirical grounds to entirely rule out the possibility of fluctuations in the actual
universe, it would still be interesting to investigate how serious the problem would be
if fluctuations were possible.
Assuming that there are suitable fluctuations in the universe, then we can use them
to explain the origin of the initial low-entropy state described by the Past Hypothesis.
The universe started in some generic microstate x0 “chosen at random” from phase space
(restricted to the energy hypersurface). Most likely it started in thermal equilibrium,
and it will stay in that state for a long time. However, given enough time, it will
fluctuate into lower-entropy states. Eventually, it will fluctuate into an extremely
low-entropy state—the macrostate M(0) selected by the Past Hypothesis. From that
state, the universe will grow in entropy, as we have explained on TM. (See Figure 3.)
Therefore, the Fluctuation Hypothesis can also explain time’s arrow, and it does so
without postulating a special initial condition. To summarize, the Fluctuation Theory
(TF) consists in the following postulates:
1. The fundamental dynamical laws.
16For some recent work, see Carroll (2017) for discussions about the possibility of a finite-dimensional
Hilbert space.
10
2. A uniform probability distribution over all microstates (on the energy shell).
Hence, TF is essentially TM without PH. To see this, we note that SP can be understood
as the uniform probability distribution that is conditionalized on any initial condition.
In TM, SP is conditionalized on PH. In TF, there is no special initial condition, so the
probability distribution remains completely uniform over all microstates on phase
space.
2.3 Self-Locating Probabilities
How should we adjudicate between TM and TF, when both seem to explain time’s
arrow? One could appeal to super-empirical virtues. For example, TF seems much
simpler than TM: it has fewer axioms. Moreover, TF seems less ad hoc than TM: in
explaining the temporal asymmetry, it does not break temporal symmetry by adding a
special initial condition (PH).
However, things are more subtle than they seem. There are two lines of reasoning
that are often considered. On the first line of reasoning, it seems that TF is much worse
than TM. It is rare to have thermodynamic fluctuations, and it is extremely rare to have
fluctuations that produce an extremely low-entropy state such as M(0). Intuitively,
therefore, on TF it is extremely unlikely to find ourselves living in the current state—a
medium-entropy state not too long after the Big Bang and some time away from
thermodynamic equilibrium. Most likely, the intuition goes, we would find ourselves
in the equilibrium, which is contrary to our evidence.
On the second line of reasoning, TF is no worse than TM. Although it is true that large
fluctuations are infrequent, they do occur given enough time. Indeed, large fluctuations
will occur with probability close to 1 if we wait long enough. Therefore, in a universe
described by TF, some creatures will find themselves in a state that is exactly like our
current macrostate.
Both lines of reasoning seem plausible. The difference is that they are tracking
two kinds of probabilities: de dicto probabilities and self-locating (de se) probabilities.
To appreciate this distinction, we need to understand the distinction between de dicto
propositions and self-locating (de se) propositions. Let us recall Perry’s example (1977)
of Lingens who is lost in the Stanford library:
An amnesiac, Rudolf Lingens, is lost in the Stanford library. He reads
a number of things in the library, including a biography of himself, and a
detailed account of the library in which he is lost. . . . He still won’t know
who he is, and where he is, no matter how much knowledge he piles up,
until that moment when he is ready to say, “This place is aisle five, floor six,
of Main Library, Stanford. I am Rudolf Lingens."(Perry 1977, p.492)
In this context, we may understand the sentences “This place is aisle five, floor six, of
Main Library, Stanford” and “I am Rudolf Lingens” express self-locating propositions.
Intuitively, we may think of self-locating propositions as expressed by sentences in
which the occurrences of indexical terms such as “This” and “I" are in some sense
essential. On an influential way of thinking (due to Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979)), such
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propositions can have special epistemic significance. With book reading, Lingens the
amnesiac can pile up knowledge of propositions de dicto, but no matter how much he
gains in such knowledge he may still lack knowledge of certain self-locating propositions
about who he is and where he is. As Ninan (2021) emphasizes, self-locating (de se)
propositions can also have behavioral significance, which sets them apart from de dicto
propositions that happen to be about oneself. Consider Perry’s case of bear attack:
When you and I both apprehend the thought that I am about to be
attacked by a bear, we behave differently. I roll up in a ball, you run to get
help. (Perry 1977, p.494)
Ninan observes that the distinctive feature of self-locating propositions is their role in
the prediction and explanation of action. For example, in certain theoretical frameworks
(such as Lewis’s centered-world model described below), we can postulate a law-like
generalization: necessarily, for all individuals x, if x believes de se that if she rolls up in
a ball, the bear will leave, and x wants the bear to leave, then, if all else is equal, x′s
having these attitudes will motivate x to roll up in a ball (Ninan 2021, p.20). Consider
another example that is relevant to our discussion of fluctuations: if at time t there are
two subjectively indistinguishable copies of me (At and Bt) in world w, even when I
am maximally certain about all the de dicto propositions (what the world is objectively
like; for example, specified in terms of matter distribution in spacetime), I can still be
uncertain about the self-locating proposition that I could express by saying “I am At.”
Moreover, believing such propositions can have behavioral significance just as in the
bear-attack case. Let us use a case of Elga (2004) that is much discussed in the literature.
Suppose Bt is Dr. Evil sitting in his impregnable battlestation on the moon and At is
Dup, the subjectively indistinguishable copy of Dr. Evil created by the Philosophy
Defense Force on Earth. If Dup performs actions that correspond to deactivating the
battlestation and surrendering, Dup will be treated well; otherwise Dup will be tortured.
If Dr. Evil believes in the self-locating proposition that he could express by saying “I
am At,” assuming he does not want to be tortured, he will be motivated to deactivate
the battlestation and surrender. If Dup (or anyone else) believes in that self-locating
proposition, assuming he does not want to be tortured, he will (all else being equal) be
motivated to act in the same way. Moreover, if Dup (or anyone else) believes in the
proposition that he could express by saying to Dr. Evil, you are At, then this belief and
Dup’s desire of not wanting to be tortured will not motivate Dup to surrender.17
17Three remarks: (i) Lewis and Perry do not characterize the de se / self-location phenomenon in terms
of propositions. Lewis (1979) thinks that the previous sentences involving “This” and “I” express not
propositions but property self-ascriptions. Perry (1977) gives another account. For convenience, here
I adopt the perspectives and terminology of Egan (2006) and Ninan (2010) and take them to express
propositions. The difference does not matter to the rest of the arguments. (ii) Not everyone is convinced
of the Perry-Lewis view (even after setting aside the issue about property-ascriptions vs. propositions).
For some examples of critical perspectives, see Millikan (1990) and Cappelen and Dever (2013). (iii) The
main arguments of this paper can still go through even if my arguments (or Ninan’s criterion) don’t
establish that the relevant propositions and probabilities are distinctively self-locating. If one does not
think of them as distinctively self-locating, one can still agree that they are about particular agents, such
as you and me. As such, we can agree that they are “agent-linked” propositions and probabilities. I
can rephrase the summary in §1: the main arguments in the paper can be seen as a dilemma. Either
self-locating probabilities (or agent-linked probabilities, if one is not convinced they are distinctively
12
The earlier characterization in terms of indexicals serves as only an intuitive gloss
and need not be taken as a necessary and sufficient condition. It is controversial
how to give a precise account of the de se / self-location phenomenon. Which model
we choose does not impact the rest of the arguments; readers can use their favorite
models. For concreteness, I will focus on Lewis’s model of centered worlds (1979).18
A centered world is a pair of <world, (time-slice of) individual> (Lewis 1979, p.147).
We can think of a possible world as a map of what the world might be like, and a
centered world as a map with a “you are here” arrow pointing to a particular individual
(Egan 2006, pp.105-106). We may follow Lewis (1979, p.149) and define self-locating
probabilities as probability distributions over the space of centered worlds. On this
model, de dicto probabilities and self-locating (de se) probabilities are not that different
in structure: both are modeled as probability distributions over some space. The
difference lies in the points on that space; the points on the first one being worlds and
the points on the second one being centered worlds.19 Intuitively, a de dicto probability
distribution is defined over only propositions de dicto, while a self-locating probability
distribution is defined over self-locating propositions (of the interesting kind, in the
sense explained in the previous footnote). Self-locating probabilities can be used to
describe my uncertainty over where I am in space or time. Recall the earlier example
that at time t there are two subjectively indistinguishable copies of me (At and Bt) in
world w such that I am maximally certain about what the world is objectively like but
still be uncertain about my self-location (whether I am At or Bt). This can be represented,
say in the case of equal uncertainty of my self-location, by assigning probability 0.5
to < w,At > and probability 0.5 to < w,Bt >. Self-locating probabilities can count as
a kind of agent-linked probabilities,20 as the basic points of its probability space are
<world, (time-slice of) individual> pairs, which are made out of not just worlds but
self-locating) have a place in a scientific explanation or they do not. Both horns can be problematic. If
they do not have a place in a scientific explanation, the Past Hypothesis explanation is insufficient. If
they do have a place, there is in-principle empirical underdetermination.
18For some examples of other accounts, see Perry (1977, 1979), Stalnaker (1981, 2010), and Kaplan
(1989).
19Lewis’s definition is a good start, but there are several things worth clarifying. Egan (2006) shows that,
on the centered-worlds model, propositions de dicto can be constructed from self-locating propositions
(centered-worlds propositions), making the former a kind of the latter. Egan calls a de dicto proposition
a boring centered-worlds proposition, where a centered-worlds proposition p is boring just in case p
includes, for each world w, either all of the inhabitants in w or none of them. Ninan (2010, p.553) renders
the condition as follows: for any world w, and inhabitants x, y in w, < w,x > ∈ p if and only if < w, y >
∈ p. An interesting self-locating proposition is a non-boring centered proposition for which the above
condition fails. For our purposes, we can extend Egan’s distinction from propositions to probability
distributions. A de dicto probability distribution is a boring kind of self-locating probability distribution
such that (1) it is defined over a sample space of centered worlds, and (2) its event space is at least as
coarse-grained as the one constructed out of the boring self-locating propositions (the de dicto ones).
We make condition (2) more precise as follows. The σ-algebra F of the boring self-locating probability
distribution is one where F includes at most the following: (a) the entire sample space Ω, the set of
all centered worlds, (b) all the boring self-locating propositions, defined above by Egan, and (c) any
proposition formed by complementation and countable union from those in (a) and (b). We define an
interesting self-locating probability distribution to be one whose σ-algebra includes at least one interesting
self-locating proposition. We do not need to further require that the interesting self-locating proposition
receives non-zero probability, because if it receives zero probability, then its complement, which is an
interesting self-locating proposition, receives non-zero probability.
20I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this term.
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also (time-slices of) individual agents.21
With the distinction between de dicto and de se (self-location) in mind, let us go back
to the two lines of reasoning. The second line of reasoning tracks de dicto probability:
the probability that there is a fluctuation in the history of the universe producing the
M(0) state is close to 1. In contrast, the first line of reasoning can be said to track de
se probability: the probability that we find ourselves located in such a fluctuation is
almost zero, given that fluctuations are so rare and fluctuations of the size of M(0)
are rare among all fluctuations. The history of the TF universe is almost entirely in
thermodynamic equilibrium, with most fluctuations being the minimal dips from
maximal entropy. But that judgment may implicitly rely on some sort of principle of
indifference over self-locating propositions: the probability that we (particular time-
slices) are in any particular time-interval is proportional to the length of that interval.
For example, the (unconditional) probability that we find ourselves in the first billion
years of the universe’s history is the same as the probability that we find ourselves in
the second billion years of the universe’s history, and so on. Since the overwhelming
majority of times is taken up by thermodynamic equilibrium and not by fluctuations, it
is extremely unlikely that we find ourselves in a fluctuation.22
Since much depends on what we mean by “our current evidence,” let me clarify. By
that phrase I mean our direct evidence, as we are attempting to examine the justification
for our inferential beliefs, including the two hypotheses. Since we are in the context of
scientific reasoning, we should be neither too stringent nor too permissive. It seems
that we should be realists about the external world. That is, we are justified in believing
that we are not BIVs or Boltzmann Brains. However, it seems inappropriate to take
ourselves to have direct access to the exact microstate of our current universe, any
states of the past universe, or any states of the future universe. All of them are usually
inferred from our direct evidence. For our discussions below, we can entertain different
ideas about our evidence that satisfy those constraints. For concreteness, as a first
approximation, we stipulate that our current evidence consists in what Albert (2000)
calls the directly surveyable condition of the world currently happens to be, i.e. the
macrocondition of the world at this instant, which includes, for example, the locations
and configurations of galaxies, planets, tables, chairs, observers, pointers used in
21Alternatively, we can think of the basic points—the centered worlds—as <world, spacetime point>
pairs, where the spacetime point represents a possible location of the individual. This model is suggested
(but not endorsed) by Quine (1968). As Lewis notes, the two models are equivalent in many situations,
but having the center as a spacetime point is more restrictive in the sense that we have to assume that no
two individuals occupy the same spacetime point. Below, various versions of NPH and MEH can be
understood using either model.
22Two remarks: (i) Strictly speaking, on Lewis’s centered-worlds model, this may not count as a
self-locating probability distribution. If we assume that no individuals can exist at those spacetime points
during thermodynamic equilibrium, then there can’t be self-locating uncertainty over whether we are
at those spacetime points. This is a place where Quine’s model of centered worlds in terms of <world,
spacetime point> pairs may be more flexible. Fortunately this does not matter to my main argument, as
this principle serves only to introduce a more sophisticated principle that can be a self-locating probability
distribution. All the later principles are compatible with Lewis’s model. (ii) This discussion somewhat
resembles the debate about fine-tuning argument for design and the multiverse response. The multiverse
proponent invokes the anthropic principle, emphasizing on the observation-selection effect. The “this
universe” objection to the multiverse response focuses on the self-locating element in our evidence,
which seems to track a different kind of probability. See, for example, White (2000) and Manson and
Thrush (2003) for discussions.
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detection devices, photographs, and newspapers.23 The central question is whether
such evidence is sufficient epistemic ground for either hypothesis. Let us take our
current evidence E to be the following:
Evidence: Our current evidence E is the medium-entropy macrostate of the universe
at this moment.
How do TM and TF compare with respect to our current evidence E? Suppose we
use the Bayesian framework of theory comparison. Which one has higher posterior
probability? According to the argument below, it seems that TM wins the competition:
The Master Argument
P1 Our current evidence E is much less likely on TF than on TM:
P(E∣TF)≪ P(E∣TM).
P2 TF is roughly as intrinsically likely as TM:
P(TF) ≈ P(TM).
C TF is much less likely than TM given our current evidence E:
P(TF∣E)≪ P(TM∣E).








For now, we have adopted a “uniform” prior probability over temporally self-
locating propositions: we could be anywhere in time, with a probability distribution
that is uniform over the entire history (or more or less flat).24 Let us call this assumption
PoI-De-Se (inspired by a restricted version of the principle of indifference). This
assumption is simple, but it is arguably an oversimplification. If we do not exist, we
cannot observe the universe. Any agent considering what kind of prior probability
she should adopt should also take into the a priori fact that she does exist and have
certain conscious experiences. Suppose materialism about the mind is true, then
her existence and experiences would require the existence of certain physical states.
23See Albert 2000, p.96. This is obviously too generous, but it will simplify things. The arguments
below are robust with respect to reasonable relaxation of this condition. For the worry that it may be too
restrictive, see §3.6(B).
24Technically speaking, for a universe without temporal boundaries, the uniform distribution is
no longer normalizable. To have a normalizable probability distribution, we could use a Gaussian
distribution that is more or less flat, centered on some point in time. This introduces a temporal
bias near the center of the Gaussian. This problem of non-normalizability comes up frequently in
cosmology when we consider infinite models. Ideally we would like to find a particular natural choice of
measure or probability distribution, which may not exist. For an interesting philosophical discussion on







Figure 4: Boltzmann Brains
Suppose a thinking brain (or something like it) is the minimal requirement for her
existence and experience. By taking into account her own existence and experience
(which is knowledge a priori), she ought to rule out those time intervals containing no
brains or no brains that have her experiences. This will produce a biased probability
distribution—she is equally likely to be any brain with her conscious experiences as
any other brain. Call this distribution PoI-De-Se*.
Assuming PoI-De-Se*, then, the first premise of the Master Argument does not
go through so easily. We are not as likely to be in any interval in time as any other
interval. Our temporal location is restricted to those intervals where there are conscious
beings with our experiences, which is a severe restriction. However, another problem
arises. The vast majority of fluctuations in the universe are quite small. Typically,
they are small deviations from thermal equilibrium. It is very rare for the universe to
fluctuate into something like a Big Bang state. It is exponentially more common for it to
fluctuate just into the current macrostate. Moreover, it is exponentially more common
for it to fluctuate just into a state with no structure at all except for a number of brains
thinking the same thoughts we do now (and even more common for it to fluctuate
into a state with just one brain). (See Figure 4.) They would have all the memories of
the past (which would be false) and all the perceptions of the present (which would
be non-veridical). These unfortunate beings are called Boltzmann brains. Since there
are exponentially more Boltzmann brains than ordinary observers, by PoI-De-Se*, we
should be much more confident that we are Boltzmann brains, which is absurd. Let us
call this the Boltzmann brains problem.
In our context, the Boltzmann brains problem comes up as we try to fix TF by adding
a biased self-locating probability distribution. That TF has this problem seems to be
another argument for TM. But is it? Unfortunately, things are not so neat. TM also faces
its own version of the Boltzmann brain problem.
For a universe starting from a low-entropy state (given the Past Hypothesis), it will
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with overwhelming probability (given the Statistical Postulate) increase in entropy.
However, after it reaches thermodynamic equilibrium, the highest level of entropy, it will
fluctuate downward in entropy if we wait long enough. The smallest such fluctuations
compatible with our conscious experiences, which are also the most frequent, will again
be the Boltzmann brain fluctuations. They will be the minimal fluctuations compatible
with our experiences, ones in which there are a few brains floating temporarily in an
environment that is otherwise devoid of any structure. Given TM, it is nonetheless the
case that typical observers (with our experiences) in the universe will be Boltzmann
brains. If PoI-De-Se* is the correct self-locating probability distribution, we are most
likely Boltzmann brains, which is absurd.
Here is the upshot of our discussion so far: both TM and TF face the Boltzmann
brains problem. It is really a problem about temporal self-location. So we will also
call it the self-location problem. If I come to believe in the self-locating / centered-worlds
proposition that I could express by saying, “I am the first Boltzmann brain after the
universe has first reached thermal equilibrium,” and if I want to be accurate in my
beliefs, then I will be motivated to revise many of my beliefs about the past, the present,
and the future. For example, I used to believe that I was born to human parents and
grew up a normal life, but I now deduce from my new self-locating belief that I was in
fact created by a small fluctuation from thermal equilibrium, as the result of a bunch of
particles randomly moving together in the shape of a brain having my current thoughts
and apparent memories. If I want to be accurate in my beliefs, I will be motivated to
revise my belief that I was born to human parents and grew up a normal life. That will
be an epistemic action similar to the roll-up-in-a-ball action in the bear attack case and
the surrender action in the Dr. Evil case. Everyone else sharing those attitudes and
the self-locating belief will (all else being equal) also be motivated to perform such an
epistemic action and revise their beliefs. Moreover, if someone has the same desire for
accuracy but instead believe in the proposition that they could express by saying to me,
you are the first Boltzmann brain after the universe has first reached thermal equilibrium, they
will not be motivated to revise their beliefs.
To be sure, the problem may seem to be just another skeptical hypothesis. Never-
theless, it is worth thinking about what one’s response ought to be in this particular
case. To try another response: suppose we defend TM by stipulating that we are not
Boltzmann brains, and that we are ordinary observers living in the actual macrostate E,
which contains not just a few brains but also the normal kind of environment—planet
Earth, the solar system, the Milky way, etc. Suppose further that we have a uniform
self-locating probability distribution over (observers living inside) the occurrences
of macrostate E (which we assume will occur many times in the long history of the
universe). Call this distribution PoI-De-Se**.25 This is still not sufficient for getting
the monotonic increase of entropy for TM. The minimal fluctuations compatible with
E are the medium-entropy dip from thermodynamic equilibrium, in which E is the
local minimum of entropy and the entropy is higher in both directions of time. Again,
there will be overwhelmingly more minimal fluctuations than large deviations that
25This is related to the indifference principle for self-locating belief Elga (2004) advocates for Dr. Evil:
similar centered worlds deserve equal credence. Whether they are the same depends on the meaning of
Elga’s notion of “similarity.”
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first produce a low-entropy state described by the Past Hypothesis and then increase in
entropy all the way to E. Hence, by the lights of TM and PoI-De-Se**, it is most likely
that we have symmetric histories, just as on TF and PoI-De-Se**.
How, then, should defenders of TM get out of the present conundrum and predict
a (typical) monotonic increase of entropy? A possible strategy is to entirely abandon
these versions of PoI-De-Se. Instead, they may choose a much more biased distribution,
called the Near Past Hypothesis:
NPH: We are currently located in the first epoch of the universe—between the time
when the Past Hypothesis applies and the first thermodynamic equilibrium; we
are equally likely to be any ordinary observers (inside the first epoch) that have
our current experiences.
The last clause of uniform distribution is to make it less specific. As usual, there is
a trade-off between informativeness and simplicity. Here we have already made the
distribution extremely specific—about the first epoch. However, in order to have a
good theory, we should make the postulate as simple as possible given that constraint.
In particular, we should avoid specifying the exact space-time locations of the observers.
Thus, we postulate a uniform self-locating distribution on this interval. Winsberg (2010,
2012) and Loewer (2016) postulate a version of NPH for which we are located in the
first epoch of the universe. The ideas are similar (and I believe Winsberg (2010) gives
the principle its name). However, they do not explicitly connect them to self-locating
probabilities.
Given NPH, our temporal location is restricted to the first epoch of the universe,
between the time when the Past Hypothesis applies and the first equilibrium. Thus,
we are in the period of “normal history,” where fluctuations are probably non-existent.
Given our current evidence E, then we can predict that our past had lower entropy
and our future will have higher entropy, which meets our goal to predict a monotonic
increase of entropy around us. NPH is informative—perhaps too informative for
a self-locating distribution. It is intended as an objective norm for the self-locating
probability that goes beyond simple indifference.26 It would be even more compelling
if we can derive it from more self-evident principles about rationality. Unfrotunately it
is hard to see how such a derivation would go. Absent such derivations, we should
add NPH as a fundamental postulate to TM.
To be sure, it seems odd to have a postulate like NPH in the fundamental theory
of physics, even though it plays the same role as explaining temporal asymmetry as
the Past Hypothesis and Statistical Postulate. The self-locating character of NPH raises
many questions. Since it is unlikely to be derivable from anything else, should we treat
it as an objective and fundamental physical law? Alternatively, should we treat it as
merely a rationality principle? I am not sure, even though the arguments show that
something like NPH is needed.27 Winsberg (2010) argues that the self-locating character
26There is another place we could postulate such norms—a Many-Worlds interpretation of quantum
mechanics in which the Born rule is a self-locating probability not derived from simple axioms but put in
by hand. This might be the best strategy forward if none of the existing derivations is compelling. See
Sebens and Carroll (2016) for an interesting recent attempt of deriving the Born rule from other epistemic
principles.
27For a recent proposal of how to make sense of “centered” objective probabilities, see Wilhelm (2020).
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of NPH is sufficient to reject the fundamentalist vision behind the Past Hypothesis
explanation. Either self-locating probabilities have no place in a scientific theory and
should not be invoked in scientific explanations, or they have a place and can be invoked
in scientific explanations. For the rest of the paper, I consider the latter. In §3, I argue
that even assuming NPH can appear in a scientific theory, there is a sense in which the
explanation cannot be purely scientific because of robust underdetermination.
In any case, notwithstanding its self-locating character, NPH gets the work done
for TM. Given NPH and our evidence E, TM predicts the correct temporal asymmetry
of monotonic entropy growth. Let us use T∗M to designate the combined theory of
TM +NPH. Hence, we have arrived at the Self-Location Thesis:
Self-Location Thesis The explanation of time’s arrow by TM requires an additional
postulate about self-locating probabilities.
3 Underdetermination and Skepticism
In this section, we suggest that, if it is permissible to save TM with self-locating
probabilities, we may find two different theories, with different implications for
time’s arrow, that are in-principle underdetermined. That may open a new door to
radical epistemological skepticism. First, I will consider a strategy of strengthening
the Fluctuation Theory by using self-locating probabilities. Second, I will introduce
“Boltzmann bubbles.” Third, I will present a new version of the Master Argument
according to which the revised Fluctuation Theory is on a par with, if not better than,
the strengthened Mentaculus Theory T∗M. Fourth, I will argue that this leads to radical
skepticism. Finally, I will consider some possible responses to the skeptical conclusion.
3.1 The Medium Entropy Hypothesis
We saved TM from the self-location problem by choosing a temporally biased self-
locating distribution—NPH. We will now argue from parity and show that we can
choose another self-locating distribution to save TF from the self-location problem.
Recall that TF has lower posterior probability given E than TM, because TF assigns
low probability to the self-locating proposition E assuming some plausible versions of
the principle of indifference. If we can find a way to make E as probable on TF as on
T∗M, then TF would be on a par with T
∗
M with respect to our evidence. In fact, a strategy
exists. Let us add to TF the following Medium Entropy Hypothesis:
MEH: We are currently located in a medium fluctuation of a special kind; we are in a
fluctuated state of medium entropy and strong correlations; we are equally likely
to be any observers (inside these states) that have our current experiences.
MEH is similar to NPH, the self-locating postulate in T∗M. Without MEH, and with only
some versions of PoI-De-Se, TM predicts that we are most likely Boltzmann brains, and
we are the results of tiny fluctuations. With MEH, our temporal location is restricted





Figure 5: Medium Entropy Fluctuations
deviations from equilibrium than Boltzmann brain fluctuations (see Figure 5). However,
they are not as large as the deviations that are required to produce a low-entropy
state described by the Past Hypothesis. Even so, given that we are located in certain
medium-entropy fluctuations, we are guaranteed that we are most likely not Boltzmann
brains.28
(One might reasonably ask: Is MEH the most natural strategy? Why not just
postulate that we are currently located in a period of relaxation following a large
fluctuation that resembled the initial state described by the Past Hypothesis? The short
answer is that such a large fluctuation is overwhelmingly less frequent to occur than
medium fluctuations that just produce the current macrostate. Among versions of the
Fluctuation Hypothesis compatible with our current evidence being E, other things
being equal, it is reasonable to have a prior distribution favoring those versions that
postulate we are more likely to be located in shorter and smaller fluctuations than those
that postulate we are more likely to be in longer and larger fluctuations. We return to
this point in §3.2 and §3.5.)
The requirement that the medium fluctuations have to display strong correlations
is to make the theory predictively equivalent to the Past Hypothesis. There are many
medium-entropy fluctuations that are abnormal from our point of view, i.e. there are no
correlations among different parts of space. For example, a medium-entropy fluctuation
may contain a photograph of Barack Obama but no real person of Barack Obama; it may
contain a left shoe of Napoleon but no right shoe of Napoleon; it may contain a book
about pyramids but no real pyramids. These medium-entropy fluctuations, although
devoid of the usual correlations among things in space, can nonetheless have medium
level of entropy. Their amount of disorder is not lower or higher than the present
28Given enough time, there will be some medium-entropy fluctuations that are like E but also contain
small local fluctuations of Boltzmann brains with our conscious experiences. But these cases are extremely
rare. Given the “uniform” probability distribution over observers with our conscious experiences, we
are very unlikely to be Boltzmann brains.
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macrostate E. But they are dramatically different from E. In fact, most medium-entropy
fluctuations are without the right kind of correlations we are used to. That is why we
need to add the condition that we are located in the right kind of fluctuations—ones
that not only have the right level of entropy but also display strong correlations.
However, it may be complicated to specify exactly what the correlations are. In T∗M,
the Past Hypothesis plays an important role in explaining the correlations. Possible
microstates coming out of the Past Hypothesis macrostate will become worlds with
the right kind of correlations—they will start from a low-entropy state of hot, dense,
contracted cosmic soup and will evolve into states with galaxies and more structures.
The correlations are already built into the selection of a special low-entropy initial
macrostate. We can exploit the Past Hypothesis to define the correlations in the following
way:
Strong Correlations: The relevant medium-entropy fluctuations are those that produce
macrostates that display the same kind of correlations29 as if they evolved from
the Past Hypothesis initial condition in the first epoch of the universe.
That is, the macrostates produced by medium-entropy fluctuations are exactly those
macrostates allowed by NPH. Let us call macrostates allowed by NPH normal macrostates.
These are the kind of macrostates with strong correlations. Thus, we can change MEH
into the following:
MEH’: We are currently located in a normal macrostate produced by a medium fluctua-
tion; we are equally likely to be any observers (inside such macrostates) that have
our current experiences.
By locating ourselves in medium fluctuations that produce normal macrostates, MEH’
provides a probabilistic boost to the self-locating proposition that E is our current
evidence. In fact, since the possible macrostates are exactly the same on the two theories,
the probability that TF +MEH′ assigns to E is exactly the same as that assigned by T∗M.
Let us use T∗F to designate the combined theory of TF +MEH′.
3.2 Boltzmann Bubbles
Before revisiting the Master Argument, let us pause and think where we are and
compare the current situation with that of the Boltzmann brains. By the lights of T∗F ,
most likely we are in a state of “local entropy minimum,” for which entropy is higher
in both directions of time. It is produced by a medium-entropy fluctuation of the right
sort described by MEH’. As explained before, the fluctuation is not the same kind that
produces Boltzmann brains. The current macrostate has the right sort of structure
as we would believe—football stadiums, motorcycles, Jupiter, the Milky way, and
etc. Most importantly, there are human beings with physical bodies attached to their
29One might object that the “same kind of correlatioins” is vague. However, any admissible changes to
the meaning will not make much of a difference. It is worth remembering that the Past Hypothesis as
formulated in Boltzmannian statistical mechanics is also a vague postulate. On pain of imposing too
much sharpness in nature, the partition of phase space into macrostates (and the selection of a particular
low-entropy initial macrostate), as introduced in §2.1 and Figure 1, is a vague matter.
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brains thinking and living in normal kinds of environment. The current macrostate
is a fluctuation, but it is much larger than the Boltzmann brain fluctuations. Thus,
the fluctuation has the right sort of structure extended in space. We will call it a
Boltzmann bubble fluctuation. Given just our present evidence E, the Boltzmann bubble
is an instantaneous macrostate which describes a normal spatial configuration. The
minimal fluctuation compatible with a Boltzmann bubble is going to be one in which
the Boltzmann bubble is the local entropy minimum, and entropy is higher in both
directions of time.
In contrast to the Boltzmann brain scenarios, the introduction of Boltzmann bubbles
makes T∗F much more epistemically robust. Suppose we have strong philosophical
reasons to believe that we are not brains in vats. Then we may have similar strong
reasons to believe that we are not Boltzmann brains. (The analogy is not perfect. Unlike
BIVs, the existence of Boltzmann brains in the actual world is a salient feature given
current physics.) However, our philosophical intuitions against the possibility that we
are in an instantaneous Boltzmann bubble that is extended in space and compatible
with our current evidence E are likely weaker and less clear-cut. Even though it may
be implausible that we are Boltzmann brains, it may be less implausible that we are
in a Boltzmann bubble. If one worries about the temporal duration of Boltzmann
bubbles, we can add that Boltzmann bubbles do not need to be short-lived (unlike
typical Boltzmann brains); they can be extended in time. That is, a medium-level
fluctuation may produce a state that has lower entropy than E but develops into E after
five days. Can we be in a Boltzmann bubble that is macroscopically indistinguishable
from one coming out of T∗M but only has five days of “normal” history? Perhaps we
would want a longer “normal” history. What about a Boltzmann bubble that has five
years of “normal” history? By this line of thought, it soon becomes unclear where we
draw the line. It is unclear that we can a priori rule out (or assign low credence to) the
possibilities. Hence, it is unclear that we can a priori rule out the possibility that we are
in a Boltzmann bubbles.
One might prefer to live in a Boltzmann bubble that stretches all the way back
to a low-entropy state (such as the same initial macrostate described by the Past
Hypothesis) such that the current macrostate is about 14 billion years away from the
entropy minimum of that fluctuation. To live in such a bubble requires a tremendous
amount of “luck.” Most Boltzmann bubbles compatible with our current evidence E
are not produced by a large fluctuation. The overwhelming majority of them are in fact
produced by the smallest fluctuations that dip from equilibrium down into E and then
back up to equilibrium. Hence, if we compare MEH’ with the following hypothesis, it
is difficult to (epistemically) justify the assignment of significant credence to it:
MEH14 billion years: We are currently located in a normal macrostate produced by a large
fluctuation whose entropy minimum is about 14 billion years away from us; we
are equally likely to be any observers (inside such macrostates) that have our
current experiences.
If MEH’ and MEH14 billion years are both empirically adequate, then the relevant question
is how we should assign our priors. Given that there are way more medium-level
fluctuations than large fluctuations that dip into a low-entropy macrostate, it seems
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Figure 6: Analogy to an urn problem
reasonable to place much more credence in MEH’ than in MEH14 billion years. To illustrate
with an analogy, consider an urn problem drawn in Figure 6. Suppose there are 100
colored balls in the urn and we are going to draw one at random. Suppose for some
reason we know that the ball we draw is not red, then it will be a blue ball. Hypothesis
1 says its color is navy blue; Hypothesis 2 says it is sky blue. It seems that we should
have way more credence in the first hypothesis than the second hypothesis. In §3.5,
we return to the question of empirical adequacy of MEH’ and see more clearly the
relevance of the analogy with the urn problem. For now, we assume that MEH’ is
compatible (and coheres with) our evidence. Let us thus return to T∗F , the combined
theory of TF +MEH′.
3.3 The Master Argument∗
We are ready to show that T∗F and T
∗
M are on par with respect to our evidence, which
is that the macrostate E is the one we are currently located in. Let us denote the self-
locating evidence as E∗. We can appeal to Bayesian reasoning and make the following
argument, a revised version of the Master Argument:
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The Master Argument∗








C∗ T∗F is roughly as likely as T
∗
M given our current evidence E∗:
P(T∗F ∣E∗) ≈ P(T∗M∣E∗).












First, P1∗ follows from the statements of NPH in T∗M and MEH’ in T
∗
F . The only
macrostates allowed (to be the current one) by T∗F coincides with those allowed by
T∗M. The ratio between macrostates compatible with E and all possible macrostates is
exactly the same on the two theories. Hence, the probabilities they assign to our current
evidence E∗ are the same.
Second, there are good reasons to believe that P2∗ is true. I assume that a simpler
and less ad hoc theory will be more intrinsically likely than one that is more complex
and ad hoc. These are delicate matters of judgment. However, I only argue that the two
theories are of the same order of simplicity and ad hocery, and that they are roughly
as intrinsically likely as each other. On the face of it, MEH’ in T∗F seems highly ad hoc.
Given the possibility of so many medium-entropy fluctuations, why choose only the
ones compatible with NPH? It seems that we have engineered the result by putting it
into the theory by hand. However, a similar question can be asked of NPH in T∗M. Given
the possibility of locating ourselves in so many different epochs, why choose only the
first epoch to be where we can be? So it seems that NPH is equally suspect. Thus, NPH
and MEH’ may be equally ad hoc. Hence, they seem to be tied in this respect.
There is another respect that may be relevant to intrinsic probability. NPH is
formulated without reference to MEH’, but MEH’ is formulated with explicit reference
to NPH. The definition of normal macrostates invokes NPH. Thus, MEH’ may seem more
extrinsic than NPH, in the sense that it exploits the success of another theory. But it is
not clear to me that extrinsicness is a bad thing in this case. If NPH provides a simple
way to state the restriction to certain medium-entropy macrostates, then it seems that
we can and should use that fact in formulating T∗F .30 In any case, we only need to show
30We have other examples of such extrinsic exploitation in statistical mechanics. For example,
an individualistic Boltzmannian theory of statistical mechanics may exploit the success of statistical
ensembles developed by the Gibbsian theory. The statistical ensembles are not fundamental in the
Boltzmannian theory, but they are nonetheless useful in simplifying the descriptions and calculations of
various thermodynamic quantities.
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that the two theories are roughly equal in intrinsic probability. Even if extrinsicness
knocks out some points for T∗F , as long as the disadvantage is not decisive, the two
theories are nonetheless of the same level of intrinsic probability.
Hence, we have good reasons to accept the conclusion that T∗F is roughly as likely as
T∗M given our current evidence E∗.
3.4 Skeptical Consequences
If we accept the conclusion of the Master Argument∗, then we are in trouble. Suppose
that T∗F and T
∗
M are the only two theories currently under consideration. Given the
conclusion of the Master Argument∗, our credence in each theory should be roughly
0.5.31
As we have explained earlier, while T∗M predicts a normal past history, T
∗
F predicts
a radically different one. According to T∗F , most likely we are in a medium-entropy
fluctuation. Our future is normal: entropy will increase and things will appear older.
However, our past is very different from what we remembered. In fact, we looked not
younger, but older, five years “ago,” since the entropy was higher the further we go
into the past. The past will not be like a normal past, given that we connect a normal
past with the appearance of younger selves.
T∗F predicts a symmetric history, one with entropy growing to the past and to
the future. This means that our current records and memories about the past are
systematically false. My photograph of a five-year old person, with fewer wrinkles and
more hair, does not resemble anyone in my past. The person in my past in fact has
more wrinkles and fewer hair. In this way, most of our records about the past, which
indicate a lower-entropy past, are false. And most of our memories and beliefs about
the past are false. The records and memories about the past did not grow from a Big
Bang state. Rather, they come from a random fluctuation out of thermal equilibrium,
creating the impression of a low-entropy past.
If our credence in T∗F should be roughly 0.5, then our credence in the following
should be roughly 0.5:
Skepticism about the Past: Most of our beliefs about the past are false.
That is not the full extent of the trouble we are in. Many of our beliefs about the
present and about the future are partially based on our beliefs about the past (via
induction and memory). For example, I believe that tigers are dangerous, based on what
I learnt about tigers and biology many years ago. The learning experience probably
did not happen. I believe that the UK will most likely exit the European Union, based
on what I have read in newspapers and online articles. The reading probably did not
happen. My memories were likely created by a random fluctuation.
31To be more realistic, we should consider more options, for example the possibility that both theories
are false. That may well be the case. However, given that these theories have had high explanatory success
and that we do not have any concrete proposal that does better, we should still assign some significant
credences to T∗F and T
∗
M. To be sure, someone who is convinced of the pessimistic meta-induction
argument will not be troubled by the skeptical consequences (or perhaps any conclusion of significance
that we draw from contemporary science).
25
If we come to have around 0.5 credence that most of our beliefs about the past are
false, then we should accordingly adjust our credences about the present and the future.
Hence, we should significantly lower our credences in many of our beliefs about the
present and the future. We thus enter into a state of agnosticism about many beliefs
that are dear to us. That is a kind of radical epistemological skepticism. The skeptical
problem persists even if T∗F and T
∗
M are not the only hypotheses under consideration.
If we also consider TF + MEH14 billion years, the overall probabilistic boost to counter
skepticism will be extremely small, since our prior distribution would assign a very
low probability on MEH14 billion years as a large fluctuation that produces a 14-billion year
Boltzmann bubble is extremely rare.
How should we navigate the world if we are convinced of such an argument? I do
not yet have an answer. It seems to be a surprising, if not paralyzing, lesson to draw from
physics. Physics has challenged many of our preconceived beliefs, such as about solidity,
space and time, the microscopic reality, and the existence of actual universes outside
our own. However, the skeptical consequences we draw from statistical mechanics,
and in particular from theories that attempt to explain the thermodynamic arrow of
time, impact some of our core beliefs about the world. Should we find new physical
theories that make sure that the skeptical conclusions do not follow? Or should we
embrace the surprising consequences as just another conceptual revision required by
physics? Different people will make different judgments here.
Carroll (2017) seems to suggest the first strategy. In the context of discussions
about Boltzmann brains in cosmological theories, he recognizes that the prevalence of
Boltzmann brains threatens the epistemic status of the theory. He suggests that we
try to find cosmological models in which typical observers are normal people and not
Boltzmann brains. The same can be said about Boltzmann bubbles: one could require
that cosmological models validate the principle that typical observers do not live in
a Boltzmann bubble but have normal history. But again, it is not clear how to define
“normal history” and it is perhaps vague where the boundary is.
Perhaps there are other strategies beyond the above two. In the next section, I will
discuss three different strategies.
3.5 Empirical Incoherence?
An initially promising way to respond to the skeptical argument is to point out that
T∗F is empirically incoherent: the theory undermines the empirical evidence we have
for accepting it in the first place. This is an internal feature any good theory should
have. Presumably, we came to consider T∗F based on empirical evidence for statistical
mechanics and cosmology. However, T∗F now predicts that our evidence for accepting
it has a significant probability (≈ 0.5) to be false. Our memories and records for
past experiments and observations are likely the results of random fluctuations from
equilibrium. Hence, we have good reasons to reject T∗F .32
32See Barrett (1996, 1999) for discussions about empirical incoherence, especially in the context of
quantum theories. In our context of statistical mechanics, the worry is sometimes attributed to Albert
(2000) that such theories are “cognitively unstable.” See, for example, Carroll (2017). However, I am






Figure 7: A Boltzmann Bubble that extends 500 years.
However, it is not clear if T∗F has to be empirically incoherent. Suppose the theory is
supported by evidence collected in 500 years of normal history. This period includes
all the experiments, observations, and derivations we made for classical mechanics,
quantum mechanics, cosmology, and statistical mechanics. That is, we allow E to
include not only the current macrostate but also macrostates that stretch to 500 years in
the past. Such E can still be produced by medium fluctuations, but we are no longer
near the minimum but 500 years away from it. We can revise MEH’ as follows:
MEH500 years: We are currently located 500 years away from the minimum of a medium
fluctuation that produces a normal macrostate; we are equally likely to be any
observers (inside such macrostates) that have our current experiences.
T∗F would predict that our memories about all the great physics experiments and
observations since the scientific revolution were veridical: they really happened. What
happened in the middle ages were completely different from what we thought we
know, but that does not interfere with the reasons we have for accepting the scientific
theory. The Boltzmann bubble which contains us stretches both in space and in time.
(See Figure 7.)
In other words, we can let our evidence E∗ to include whatever is necessary to
support accepting T∗F . If that requires 500 years of “normal” history, then make the
macrostate E stretch back to 500 years. That is still compatible with accepting T∗F , which
predicts that we most likely live in a Boltzmann bubble and we are 500 years from the
minimum of the recent fluctuation.
In fact, MEH500 years makes E∗ more likely than NPH does, since for each medium
fluctuation there are two possibilities for us: either on the “left” of the minimum or the
“right.” This extra probabilistic boost could be significant. For example, it could make
skeptical catastrophe” on p.116.
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Figure 8: A rough comparison of the numbers of different fluctuations (the numbers
are illustrative only and do not reflect the relevant scale)
even (in posterior probability) any loss to intrinsic probability in T∗F after we change
MEH’ to MEH500 years.
But if we are happy to accept MEH500 years as a modification of T∗F , why not go
further? Why not accept MEH501 years, MEH502 years, ..., or even MEH14 billion years? After
all, the longer we stretch the Boltzmann bubble, the more normal history there will be
in our specific fluctuation. Other things being equal, wouldn’t it be nice to have more
normal history? The answer was hinted in §3.2. It would indeed be nice, but I worry
whether that is epistemically the right thing to do. After all, there are overwhelmingly
more fluctuations compatible with the selections in MEH500 years than in MEH501 years.
And in fact, it is probably the case that there are overwhelmingly more fluctuations
compatible with the selections in MEH500 years than all the fluctuations compatible with
either MEH501 years, MEH502 years, ... , or MEH14 billion years. It seems reasonable to not have
higher credence in the disjunction of MEH501 years, MEH502 years, ... and MEH14 billion years
than in MEH500 years. In Figure 8, we provide a rough comparison of the numbers of
different fluctuations. If for a priori reasons (such as to avoid incoherence) we need
to postulate our temporal location in larger fluctuations (that are much larger than
Boltzmann brain fluctuations and have at least 500 years of normal history), we are still
left with some uncertainty over the size of fluctuation we are in. There are much more
500-year Boltzmann bubbles than 501-year Boltzmann bubbles, 502-year Boltzmann
bubbles, and 14-billion-year Boltzmann bubbles. Of course, the comparative difference
gets exponentially larger as we stretch the Boltzmann bubble from 500 years to 14 billion
years (since fluctuations have to be extremely delicate to dip all the way to something
like a Big Bang state).
By the same reasoning, should we have most of our credence in just MEH’ since
it is compatible with much more fluctuations than MEH500 years? No, the empirical
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incoherence of MEH” is sufficient to subtract much of our credence in that hypothesis.
In contrast, we assume that given 500 years of normal history, the fluctuation hypothesis
would be empirically coherent.
3.6 Other Responses
(A) Disputing the Priors. Another way to respond to the Master Argument∗ is to point
out that we should choose priors that overwhelmingly favor T∗M. This is because if we
give some weight to T∗F , then the previous argument will lead us to skepticism. To lead
a successful epistemic life, we ought to choose priors that do not lead us into skepticism.
For example, we can assign very low prior probability to T∗F to block P2∗.
This is what I would like to do in practice. However, is it always epistemically
justified? Can we always sweep under the rug any skeptical conclusion we do not like?
It would be helpful to have more general principles to guide us here.
In so far as there are any objective norms for credences, I would think that they
favor simpler theories. The reason we are warranted to assign extremely low priors
to skeptical hypotheses, in many cases, is because the skeptical hypotheses are highly
complex. The Evil Demon Hypothesis, the Brain-in-Vat Hypothesis, and the Dream
Hypothesis, one could argue, are much more complex than the Real World Hypothesis,
if we spell them out in detail.33 The Real World Hypothesis can be described with
ordinary simple laws of physics plus the usual initial conditions while the skeptical
hypotheses have to be supplemented with extra details that produce the skeptical
scenarios. (The Boltzmann Brain Hypothesis may be simpler than T∗F , but the Boltzmann
Brain Hypothesis is not empirically adequate with respect to our current evidence E∗,
as we take E∗ to be quite generous and externalistic.)
In contrast, T∗F is on the same level of simplicity as T
∗
M: they are similar cosmological
theories with self-locating postulates. If we are warranted to assign low credences in
T∗F , then it must come from other considerations beyond the usual ones based on the
complexity of the skeptical theories. However, if such considerations do apply, after
careful examination of the case at hand, that would be a welcome result indeed.
(B) Disputing the Evidence. One might object that I have an overly restrictive
conception of our current evidence. If we broaden our evidence to include everything
that is true and was true, including what the initial time around the Big Bang was like,
and how long ago it was from our current time, then the evidential base is significantly
enlarged. Call the enlarged body of evidence E+. E+ would favor T∗M over T
∗
F . Given
the enlarged body of evidence E+, the explanation is entirely scientific. E+ confirms T∗M
to a much higher degree than T∗F , and T
∗
M in turn explains the data E+.
I do not think we should include in our evidence facts extending all the way to the
Big Bang. E+ corresponds to (1) a Boltzmann bubble that extends from macrostate E
all the way back to the time of the Big Bang and (2) a self-locating claim that we are
currently located in E about 14 billion years from the Big Bang. Our beliefs about the
distant past are inferred from scientific theories. If our evidence is already so expansive,
33Take the evil demon for example. What laws describe the demon’s actions? Are there laws that
together with initial conditions that deterministically or probabilistically determine the course of the
demon’s actions? Is there a physical model for the deception process?
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and if facts about the distant past are already in our evidence, then we are justified,
without consulting any scientific theory, to have beliefs about the actual macroscopic
conditions 14 billion years “ago.” Now, in this context, we assume that there is no
fundamental arrow of time that privileges the past or the future. Hence, by symmetry
reasoning, we should also be allowed to extend our evidence in the other way: 14 billion
years away from now and away from the Big Bang (that is, towards the “future”). But
that is implausible. No one thinks that we are justified to have beliefs about what will
actually happen 14 billion years “in the future” without consulting a scientific theory.
Thus, the objection that relies on such an expansive view of evidence does not work.
It seems to rely on a problematic way of reasoning that Price (1997a) calls a temporal
‘double standard.’34
(C) Fluctuations are impossible in our universe. Although we have assumed in the
paper that fluctuations are physically possible, it is nonetheless relevant to consider
the strategy that denies that. If there are no fluctuations, then Boltzmann bubbles
cannot form. The Fluctuation Hypothesis would not work. And maybe there are
not even Boltzmann brains. In such a universe, Nature is kind to us. Empirical
underdetermination would not hold and skeptical consequences would not arise (at
least not by my arguments).
However, how much confidence should we assign to the physical impossibility of
fluctuations? It is unclear as it is still not settled in physics. Suppose we have reasonable
confidence (say, 0.6) in such an impossibility. Then there is still some probability (say,
0.4) that fluctuations can lead to the kind of underdetermination and skeptical worries.
In that case, the influence of skeptical hypothesis is much lower (knocking out at most
0.2 credence in many beliefs). However, the influence will still be felt, and a weaker
kind of skeptical worry will arise (for many propositions that have threshold credences
around 0.5). Thus, it will still be interesting to resolve the skeptical worry on the
assumption that fluctuations are possible.
In summary, the above four responses to the skeptical argument are initially
promising but ultimately inconclusive.
4 Conclusion
A long-standing problem in the foundations of physics is how to explain the arrow
of time. A promising explanation points to the Past Hypothesis, which is central to
the Mentaculus Theory. However, it faces a self-location problem if there are many
copies of us in the distant “past” or the distant “future.” In the first part of this paper, I
explained that we need to add self-locating probabilities to save the Mentaculus Theory
and derive an increase of entropy in our epoch of the universe. In the second part
of the paper, I show that such a move leads to underdetermination and opens a new
door to skepticism. I use self-locating probabilities to construct a stronger version of
the Fluctuation Theory. I argue that our evidence underdetermines between the two
theories after we include certain postulates about self-locating probabilities. We are
34In contrast, the response to the earlier worry about empirical incoherence is in a different dialectical
situation. There, what leads to that worry is the assumption that our evidence stretches 500 years towards
the past. My response is to grant that assumption and show that it can be accommodated by T∗F .
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thus led to epistemological skepticism.
Sadly, the underdetermination is robust: it is not resolved by appealing to empirical
incoherence or simplicity. It is unclear whether there is a decisive and principled reason,
besides the desire to avoid skepticism, for choosing the Mentaculus Theory over the
Fluctuation Theory. That is surprising. It seems to me that one of the attractions of
the Mentaculus / Past Hypothesis research program is the bold vision to eventually
provide a scientific explanation, in terms of objective laws of nature most confirmed by
our current evidence, for our everyday beliefs about the distinction between the past
and the future (Albert 2000, pp. ix, 96, and 119). If the only way to do so is by fiat,
by insisting that we need to avoid skepticism and that we must invoke a self-locating
probability distribution such as NPH, then it loses that attraction. First, we might
doubt whether NPH can be regarded as an objective physical law or part of an objective
physical theory. Moreover, even if NPH can appear in such a scientific explanation, it is
unclear why it is superior to its competitor (MEH’) in terms of simplicity or adequacy
with respect to our current evidence. Hence, the explanation will fail to be entirely
scientific. It is in this sense the original vision faces a difficult dilemma.
In-principle underdetermination by evidence occurs elsewhere. It is surprising here,
however, for two reasons. First, T∗F and T
∗
M are arguably equally simple and invoke
the same dynamical laws. That is not always true in other cases. For example, some
might argue that Bohmian mechanics and some version of orthodox (Copenhagen)
quantum mechanics are empirically equivalent (insofar as the latter makes determinate
predictions), but they are not equally simple and they postulate different dynamical
laws. The tie can be broken by invoking simplicity to favor Bohmian mechanics. Second,
the underdetermination here brings forth skepticism and casts doubt on the manifest
image of macroscopic arrows of time. That is not always true in other cases, such as the
Einsteinian theory of relativity vs. the Lorentzian theory of relativity with a preferred
foliation of spacetime (Bell 2004, ch.9). For the latter pair of theories, they both recover
the same manifest image of ordinary space and time (although their explanations differ).
In our case, they do not recover the same manifest image. T∗F , although compatible by
our current evidence (and equally confirmed as T∗M), is incompatible with the manifest
image of macroscopic temporal asymmetries.
The worries raised here open up new philosophical questions at the intersection of
epistemology and philosophy of physics. In the end, my conclusions are conditional on
the assumptions about what counts as an entirely scientific explanation of time’s arrow.
I suggest that such an explanation should rely on postulates most confirmed by our
current empirical evidence and should not smuggle in assumptions about time’s arrow.
It is entirely open for someone to resist my conclusion by denying the assumptions.
Hence, the worries provide opportunities for defenders of the Mentaculus Theory to
clarify and develop the epistemological and theory-choice principles underlying their
explanation. Doing so would be valuable contribution to the literature on scientific
explanations, underdetermination, and epistemological skepticism. Moreover, the
skeptical problem naturally arises when we reflect on empirical theories and put together
a promising explanation of time’s arrow with self-locating probabilities. The competing
theory is as simple. The problem may be a manifestation of a more general phenomenon.
It would be interesting to think about the connection between this problem and the
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general question of the nature of self-locating probabilities. Perhaps there is a principled
way to think about NPH such that it is the uniquely rational self-locating probabilities
to postulate. If so, that would also solve the underdetermination and skeptical worries.
As the case study shows, the postulate of self-locating probabilities in a physical
theory opens up theoretical possibilities as well as new dangers. We may wonder
whether it is appropriate to allow self-locating postulates in physics, and if so how
to think about their status and how to avoid underdetermination. Focusing on those
concrete possibilities and worries may also teach us something new about the character
of physical laws and the structure of physical theories.
Acknowledgement
I thank the editors of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research and several anonymous re-
viewers for valuable comments. I am also grateful to David Albert, Bob Beddor, D Black,
Ben Bronner, Jennifer Carr, Craig Callender, Sean Carroll, David Chalmers, Jonathan
Cohen, Antony Eagle, Branden Fitelson, Sheldon Goldstein, Veronica Gomez, Peter
Graham, Alan Hájek, Christopher Hauser, John Hawthorne, Christopher Hitchcock,
Michael Huemer, Cameron Kirk-Giannini, Kelsey Laity-D’Agostino, Joel Lebowitz,
Barry Loewer, Tim Maudlin, Bradley Monton, Oli Odoffin, Zee Perry, Richard Pettigrew,
Daniel Rubio, Eric Schwitzgebel, Charles Sebens, Jonathan Schaffer, Miriam Schoenfield,
Katie Steele, Karim Thébault, Michael Tooley, David Wallace, Isaac Wilhelm, as well as
audiences at the 2017 AAP Conference, the 2017 Time and Causality in the Sciences
Conference (TaCitS), the Sydney University Winter School on Physics and Philosophy
of Time, the 3rd Boulder Formal Value Workshop, CalTech HPS Lecture Series, Bristol
Center for Philosophy of Science, the College of William and Mary, Rutgers Philosophy
of Science Group, and Rutgers Cognitive Science Grad Talk Series, Wuhan University,
UC San Diego philosophy of science reading group, and UC Riverside Workshop on
Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind.
References
Albert, D. Z. (2000). Time and chance. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Albert, D. Z. (2015). After physics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Barrett, J. A. (1996). Empirical adequacy and the availability of reliable records in
quantum mechanics. Philosophy of Science, 63(1):49–64.
Barrett, J. A. (1999). The quantum mechanics of minds and worlds. OUP Oxford.
Bell, J. S. (2004). Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Physics: Collected Papers on
Quantum Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
Boltzmann, L. (1964). Lectures on gas theory. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Callender, C. (2004). Measures, explanations and the past: Should ‘special’ initial
conditions be explained? The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55(2):195–217.
32
Callender, C. (2011). Thermodynamic asymmetry in time. In Zalta, E. N., editor, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University,
fall 2011 edition.
Cappelen, H. and Dever, J. (2013). The inessential indexical: On the philosophical insignifi-
cance of perspective and the first person. Oxford University Press.
Carroll, S. (2010). From eternity to here: the quest for the ultimate theory of time. Penguin.
Carroll, S. M. (2017). Why boltzmann brains are bad. arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.00850.
Carroll, S. M. and Chen, J. (2004). Spontaneous inflation and the origin of the arrow of
time. arXiv preprint hep-th/0410270.
Chen, E. K. (2020). The Past Hypothesis and the nature of physical laws. In Loewer,
Barry, W. E. and Weslake, B., editors, Time’s Arrows and the Probability Structure of the
World. Harvard University Press, forthcoming.
Chen, E. K. (2022). Fundamental nomic vagueness. The Philosophical Review, 131(1).
Clausius, R. (1867). The mechanical theory of heat: with its applications to the steam-engine
and to the physical properties of bodies. J. van Voorst.
Coen, E. and Coen, J. (2010). A serious man. Faber & Faber.
Earman, J. (2006). The “past hypothesis”: Not even false. Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 37(3):399–430.
Egan, A. (2006). Secondary qualities and self-location. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 72(1):97–119.
Elga, A. (2004). Defeating Dr. Evil with self-locating belief. Philosophy and Phenomenolog-
ical Research, 69(2):383–396.
Feynman, R. (2017). The Character of Physical Law. Cambridge: MIT press.
Feynman, R. P., Leighton, R. B., and Sands, M. (2011). The Feynman lectures on physics,
Vol. I: The new millennium edition: mainly mechanics, radiation, and heat, volume 1. Basic
books (first published in 1964 by Addison-Wesley).
Fitelson, B. (2006). Does the principle of indifference rest on a mistake? Unpublished
manuscript.
Fitelson, B. (2007). Likelihoodism, bayesianism, and relational confirmation. Synthese,
156(3):473–489.
Goldstein, S. (2001). Boltzmann’s approach to statistical mechanics. In Bricmont, J.,
Dürr, D., Galavotti, M. C., Ghirardi, G., Petruccione, F., and Zanghì, N., editors,
Chance in Physics, pages 39–54. Berlin: Springer.
33
Goldstein, S., Lebowitz, J. L., Tumulka, R., and Zanghì, N. (2020). Gibbs and Boltzmann
entropy in classical and quantum mechanics. In Allori, V., editor, Statistical Mechanics
and Scientific Explanation: Determinism, Indeterminism and Laws of Nature. Singapore:
World Scientific.
Goldstein, S. and Tumulka, R. (2011). Approach to thermal equilibrium of macroscopic
quantum systems. In Non-Equilibrium Statistical Physics Today: Proceedings of the 11th
Granada Seminar on Computational and Statistical Physics, AIP Conference Proceedings,
volume 1332, pages 155–163. American Institute of Physics, New York.
Goldstein, S., Tumulka, R., and Zanghì, N. (2016). Is the hypothesis about a low entropy
initial state of the universe necessary for explaining the arrow of time? Physical
Review D, 94(2):023520.
Ismael, J. (2008). Raid! dissolving the big, bad bug. Noûs, 42(2):292–307.
Kaplan, D. (1989). Demonstratives. In Almog, J., Perry, J., and Wettstein, H., editors,
Themes from Kaplan, pages 481–563. Oxford University Press, New York.
Lebowitz, J. L. (2008). Time’s arrow and Boltzmann’s entropy. Scholarpedia, 3(4):3448.
Lewis, D. (1979). Attitudes De Dicto and De Se. Philosophical Review, 88:513–43.
Loewer, B. (2001). Determinism and chance. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 32(4):609–620.
Loewer, B. (2004). David Lewis’s Humean theory of objective chance. Philosophy of
Science, 71(5):1115–1125.
Loewer, B. (2016). The Mentaculus vision. Manuscript.
Loewer, B. (2020). The Mentaculus. In Barry Loewer, Eric Winsberg, B. W., editor, Time’s
Arrows and the Probability Structure of the world. Harvard University Press, forthcoming.
Manson, N. A. and Thrush, M. J. (2003). Fine-tuning, multiple universes, and the “this
universe” objection. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 84(1):67–83.
McGrew, T., McGrew, L., and Vestrup, E. (2001). Probabilities and the fine-tuning
argument: a sceptical view. Mind, 110(440):1027–1038.
Millikan, R. G. (1990). The myth of the essential indexical. Noûs, pages 723–734.
Ninan, D. (2010). De Se attitudes: Ascription and communication. Philosophy Compass,
5(7):551–567.
Ninan, D. (2021). De Se Attitudes and Action. In Biggs, S. and Geirsson, H., editors, The
Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference, pages 482–498. Routledge.
North, J. (2010). An empirical approach to symmetry and probability. Studies In History
and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies In History and Philosophy of Modern Physics,
41(1):27–40.
34
North, J. (2011). Time in thermodynamics. The oxford handbook of philosophy of time, pages
312–350.
Penrose, R. (1979). Singularities and time-asymmetry. In Hawking, S. and Israel, W.,
editors, General relativity, pages 581–638. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Penrose, R. (1989). The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws
of physics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Perry, J. (1977). Frege on demonstratives. Philosophical Review, 86:474–97.
Perry, J. (1979). The problem of the essential indexical. Noûs, pages 3–21.
Pettigrew, R. (2014). Accuracy, risk, and the principle of indifference. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research.
Pettigrew, R. (2016). Accuracy and the Laws of Credence. Oxford University Press.
Pettigrew, R. and Titelbaum, M. G. (2014). Deference done right. Philosophers’ Imprint.
Price, H. (1997a). Cosmology, time’s arrow, and that old double standard. Time’s Arrows
Today: Recent Physical and Philosophical Work on the Direction of Time, pages 66–96.
Price, H. (1997b). Time’s arrow & Archimedes’ point: new directions for the physics of time.
Oxford University Press, USA.
Quine, W. V. O. (1968). Propositional objects. Critica, 2:3–22.
Sebens, C. T. and Carroll, S. M. (2016). Self-locating uncertainty and the origin of
probability in everettian quantum mechanics. The British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, 69(1):25–74.
Stalnaker, R. (1981). Indexical belief. Synthese, pages 129–151.
Stalnaker, R. (2010). Our knowledge of the internal world. Oxford University Press.
Uffink, J. and Valente, G. (2010). Time’s arrow and lanford’s theorem. Le temps, pages
141–173.
Wallace, D. (2011). The logic of the past hypothesis. manuscript.
White, R. (2000). Fine-tuning and multiple universes. Nous, 34(2):260–276.
Wilhelm, I. (2020). Centering the principal principle. Philosophical Studies, pages 1–19.
Winsberg, E. (2004). Can conditioning on the “past hypothesis” militate against the
reversibility objections? Philosophy of Science, 71(4):489–504.
Winsberg, E. (2010). The metaphysical foundations of statistical mechanics: on the
status of PROB and PH. In Loewer, Barry, W. E. and Weslake, B., editors, Time’s Arrows
and the Probability Structure of the World. Harvard University Press, forthcoming.
Winsberg, E. (2012). Bumps on the road to here (from eternity). Entropy, 14(3):390–406.
35
